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Abstract
The evolution of advanced technology systems in aviation has seen radically
increased capabilities of aircraft, and equally radical changes in how aircraft are
flown. Relieving flight crews of much of the manual workloads associated with
flying, automation has brought about a shift in the dynamic on the flight deck as
the role of crews - who are gradually being removed from direct control of the
aircraft - moves towards that of supervisors and managers of the vast array of
systems on-board. There is little doubt that automation has provided significant
benefits in terms of increased performance, endurance and safety. Yet the
sleekness and simplicity of the modern flight deck has proven deceptive. The
complexities of aircraft systems, their dependencies and interdependencies, may
mask interactions and inhibit the pilot's understanding of systems functionalities.
Perhaps just as importantly, as automated systems assumed greater levels of
autonomy and authority, the position of automation - and its relationship with
those other key players in the cockpit - has not always been explicitly stated. Now
managing and overseeing the aircraft’s systems, crews, whose exposure to
manual flying has been reduced largely to the take-off and landing phases of
flight, may be exposed to error causing conditions where they may not
understand what the automation is doing.
The aim of this study was to examine the effects of latent conditions (pre-
cursor faults) on the occurrence of decision errors, skill-based errors, perceptual
errors and violations (active failures / unsafe acts). Based on the ASRS data
analysis it was determined that while there was a significant number of
automation pre-cursor faults associated with Airbus, Boeing aircraft were more
likely to have mechanical related pre-cursor events.
Key Words: Active Failures, Automation, Flight Deck Design, Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System
INTRODUCTION
The aviation domain has seen technological advances that would have seemed
unimaginable to the early pioneers of powered flight. With greater performance
and endurance, aircraft are now flying faster, further, with increased safety and
precision, even in the most challenging conditions and environments. Radical
changes in the design of aircraft systems, their functions and integration and,
more recently, the use of composite materials have enabled these huge leaps in
operational capabilities. With the ability to monitor, manage and maintain the
aircraft’s systems and parameters in flight, even adjusting control surfaces to
affect changes to the aircraft’s flight profile (Boy, 1998), automation is now
somewhat of an indispensable resource.
By performing mundane and repetitive tasks, automation has reduced
crew workloads and attentional demands, allowing them to focus on tasks that
are of higher priority. As workloads shifted to the automation however, the
opportunity for a pilot to manually fly the aircraft decreased. With exposure to
manual flying limited, largely, to take-off and landing phases, the crew's
opportunity to build and retain the competencies necessary to take control during
emergent events is also reduced. Perhaps more worryingly however, should the
automation fail or disconnect without warning, crews may not have adequate
experience or knowledge of the aircraft’s systems to overcome the issue, and
reversion to manual mode may test the skills of newer and less experienced pilots
(EASA, 2013).
Automation - the consequence of the repositioning of crew authority
Though the improvements in performance and safety have been dramatic,
the relentless propagation of automation and automated systems has not been
without its problems. As automation became established and reliability was
proven, a shift in dynamic occurred on the flight deck as these systems were
given more authority and autonomy, and new management and supervisory tasks
were imposed on crews (Sarter, 1994). De-skilling and erosion of basic flying
skills becomes almost inevitable as the re-allocation of tasks and responsibilities
alters the position of the flight crew and the automation assumes a greater role in
flying the aircraft. Equally, as flight crews become more dependent on
automation, their mental state may also be altered and the potential for human
error increases. Over-confidence and complacency may induce a false sense of
security as exposure to even the smallest challenge is minimised. Further
compounding the situation, whilst many aircraft systems have evolved
independently of one another, their integration has not always been seamless,
nor has the dependencies and interdependencies of these systems been
explicitly stated.
This confluence of factors – the loss of competence, the proliferation and
over-reliance on automation and the masking of systems dependencies and
interdependencies - can, in situations where it is required to perform manual and
automated tasks simultaneously, affect the crew’s ability to detect automation
failure, resolve difficulties, or take control in the event of systems failures (Billings,
1996; Woods, 2004). Nonetheless, and despite the intricacies and complexities
of these systems, flight crews are expected to take control in circumstances
where the automation fails or cannot handle a situation.
Airbus versus Boeing - Competing Technologies and Philosophies
While standardisation is sought across the massively complex realm of
aviation, a duopoly – Airbus and Boeing – have adopted divergent philosophies
with respect to critical features such as flight handling, and levels of automation
and crew autonomy. By far the most significant difference between these two
manufacturer’s aircraft is the positioning of authority and, by extension, the
limitations (or expectations) placed on crews. Within the flight envelope the Airbus
‘hard’ limit philosophy allows the pilots to make whatever control inputs that they
desire, but the aircraft will not go beyond the limits of the envelope. In contrast,
the ‘soft’ limit philosophy adopted by Boeing allows the pilots to exceed the limits
of the envelope but, in the process, they will encounter increased control input
resistance as they approach and go beyond limits of the envelope (Abbott, 2001).
Active failures and the conditions that predispose pilots to error
Pilots, removed from direct systems control as automation assumes a
greater share of physical, perceptual and cognitive roles (Endsley, 1996; Mosier
et al., 1997), are now exposed to errors that are perhaps hidden deep within the
systems geometries or, perhaps, within computer code. Latent conditions, often
embedded in the system for a long time, provide the nexus for active failures on
the part of the flight crew. Occurring in the moment prior to an adverse event,
errors based on the degradation of skills and knowledge, violations of policies
and procedures, or from conditions that affect the crew’s perception and decision
making (collectively referred to as active failures) become ever more likely where
latency has not been identified and addressed.
Where an adverse event occurs the crew’s situational awareness may be
inhibited where the provenance of the problem is not obvious. As a situation
unfolds, crews may act as a catalyst for either recovery or acceleration towards
an adverse outcome as their understanding of the event and its causes will
influence their actions and reactions. The outcome therefore, as a function of the
crews understanding, will be either insignificant, result in an aircraft upset
condition, or be further perpetuated as errors are fed back in a cascading loop
(Helmreich, Klinect and Wilhelm, 1999).
Failures resulting from degradation or loss of knowledge and skills
Automation bias – over-relying on, or favouring automation generated
information over other cues – is another insidious factor associated with the
increased use of automated flight systems. Interestingly, automation bias (and
the inappropriate decision-making processes based on the potentially flawed
information associated with it) is not confined to less experienced pilots, and pilots
with high hours and high exposure to automation are just as likely to experience
automation bias (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). The dangers of an over-reliance
on automated systems were perhaps best exemplifies by the American Airlines
Flight 965 (a Boeing 757) accident. The crew’s attempt to expedite their arrival
into Cali, Colombia, their error in not disengaging the aircraft’s speed brakes,
failure to revert to radio navigation, and confusion caused by the Flight
Management System (FMS), all contributing to excessive workload during this
critical approach phase of flight, culminated in the loss of the aircraft after it
impacted high ground (Aeronautica Civil, 1996).
Lack of Awareness of System Functionality - Asiana Airlines
Given the complexity of the modern aircraft, it is not unexpected that latent
factors may become embedded as systems designers attempt to integrate new
technology. Despite rigorous testing, a lack of awareness of aircraft systems, their
functionality and interactions can occur amongst pilots as an unintended
consequence where latency occurs. This inhibited awareness proved deadly
when, on 6th July 2013, Asiana Flight 214 (Boeing 777-200ER) on a visual
vectored approach, impacted a seawall short of runway 28L at San Francisco
International Airport. Though the crew mismanaged the descent and failed to
stabilise the approach or initiate a go-around (despite a number of cues), a
cascading set of errors caused the pilot to inadvertently override the aircraft’s
speed protection when he made changes to the autopilot and auto-throttle
configuration. This put the aircraft into a rare mode where the auto-throttles –
which, even when switched off, can prevent the aircraft from slowing below limits
- were disabled. The pilots were found to have over-relied on the auto-throttle
system, their understanding of the operation of which was considered to be
lacking. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation,
however, found that neither Boeing’s nor the airline’s manuals explained the
system and its functions fully. While recommending that the manufacturer revise
its’ Flight Crew Training Manual (stall protection material), and to address the
limitations of the auto-throttles, the NTSB also recommended that airlines should
provide training on these aspects (NTSB, 2014). Nonetheless, it is Boeing’s
stated philosophy that it is the crew who are responsible for the safe operation of
the aircraft, and the flight deck automation is there to aid the pilots, not replace
them (Boeing, undated).
Task Saturation and Overload – Air France Flight AF447
Another significant issue often identified in investigation reports is
saturation or overload experienced by crews in the lead-up to an accident.
Ironically, while the automation on advanced technology flight decks is intended
to relieve the workloads on crews, information overload has led crews to commit
errors based on information that was not prioritised or conflicted with other cues
or information that was present in their environment.
Flight crews can become saturated or overloaded particularly during
critical phases of flight or where adverse situations present. This was the case in
the event involving Air France Flight AF447. Caught unaware when confronted
by conflicting and erroneous data, the crew became increasingly disorientated by
what the aircraft was doing. In response to corrupted airspeed data, and without
prior warning to the crew, the autopilot and auto-thrust functions disengaged and
the aircraft systems reverted to alternate control law - where normal stall
protection was inhibited (Geiselman et al., 2013). In an attempt to recover the
aircraft, the First Officer initiated a series of inputs that, unknown to the crew,
brought the aircraft to aerodynamic stall. As the situation escalated, confusion
over control authority saw both pilots making conflicting inputs on their respective
side-stick. In the minutes before impact the Angle Of Attack (AOA) exceeded 40°,
and the aircraft lost altitude at a rate of 10,000 feet per minute (BEA, 2012).
Methodology
The largest repository of de-identified aviation reports in the world (NASA,
undated), NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) has been used as
a basis for many research studies (Connell and Reynard, 1993; Funk and Wilson,
1998; Bliss, 2003).
Content Analysis
A search of the ASRS database found over 7,300 reports submitted by
crews of Airbus aircraft, and in excess of 18,000 reports submitted by crews of
Boeing aircraft on the database. As the aim of this research was to determine the
effects of automation on Airbus and Boeing flight crews, it was decided that an
iterative process would enable the researcher to confine the search parameters
and select a sample for analysis.
With the search criteria confined, a follow-up search determined that there
was just over 4,500 Airbus and slightly more than 16,000 Boeing reports relating
to automation. These reports were analysed using a content analysis package. A
data mining and textual analysis tool used for identifying word usage, themes and
trends, content analysis software is specifically suited to the analysis of
unstructured qualitative data. Despite the utility of this type of software, the
researchers were careful not to draw inference from the outputs generated by the
software (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). From this analysis the search was honed
over a number of iterations until, finally, 188 ASRS reports (94 Airbus and 94
Boeing reports) were selected for analysis for this study.
HFACS - Analysing the ASRS Reports
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
taxonomy was used to identify latent and active conditions in the 188 extracted
reports. HFACS provides a mechanism to identify and categorise not only human
error but multiple higher level factors that may have lain dormant in the lead-up
to an adverse event. Such information taxonomic systems are suited to analysis
of the factors that precipitate an event (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000; Stanton
and Salmon, 2009). The ASRS data were coded using the HFACS taxonomy and
analysed to determine the extent of active failures (violations, perceptual errors,
skill-based errors or decision based errors) present in the reports. The main
researcher on this paper has developed vast knowledge and experience using
HFACS during occurrence investigation and analysis, and peer review of his
methodology has demonstrated consistency in its application. Inter-rater
reliability, therefore, was proven by this peer review oversight.
Statistical Analysis
The data were cross-tabulated and analysed using Chi-square (χ2)
analyses to determine if there was any statistical association between the
variables identified. Goodman and Kruskal’s Tau (τ) was used to test the strength 
of association found between these variables.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Of the 188 ASRS reports analysed 178 were to deemed valid for the study – it
was not possible to determine the cause on four reports, and six more were
discounted as the cause was determined to be outside the parameters of the
study (weather related or other factor, but no automation related factors).
While a significant number (58%) of automation related pre-cursor events
occurred on Airbus aircraft (p=0.022; τ=0.015), significantly more mechanical pre-
cursor issues (65%) occurred on Boeing aircraft (p=0.25; τ=0.017) (Table 1). 
Table 1. Pre-cursor Fault Types versus Aircraft Manufacturer
Airbus
n(%)
Boeing
n(%)
Total
n(%)
Chi-
square
Value
P τ Oddsratio
Automation 61 (57.5) 45 (42.5) 106 (100.0) 5.971 0.022 0.015 NS
Mechanical 16 (34.8) 30 (65.2) 46 (100.0) 5.746 0.025 0.017 2.320
Automation/
mechanical 5 (29.4) 12 (70.6) 17 (100.0) NS - - -
CRM 7 (77.8) 2 (22.2) 9 100.0) NS - - -
Total 89 (50.0) 89 (50.0) 178 (100.0) NS = Not Significant
In total, 40 events were identified as involving unsafe acts (active failures) - 18 of
these events involved decision errors, 11 violations, 9 skill-based and 2 events
involved perceptual errors (Table 2).
Automation pre-cursor faults were responsible for the majority of violations (55%),
36% of violations occurred as a result of mechanical pre-cursors, and auto /
mechanical issues account for the remaining 9% of violations.
All perceptual errors (100%) occurred because of automation.
The majority of skill-based errors (44%) occurred as a result of an automation
pre-cursor, Crew Resource Management (CRM) was responsible for 33%, and
the remaining 22% of skill-based errors occurring as a result of mechanical pre-
cursor faults.
Automation related pre-cursor faults accounted for 44% of decision errors while
mechanical pre-cursors accounted for 39%. CRM related pre-cursor faults (17%)
were least likely to result in decision errors.
Overall, automation pre-cursors accounted for the majority (48%) of unsafe acts,
mechanical for 35%, and CRM for 15%. Automation/mechanical pre-cursors were
responsible for the least number of unsafe acts.
Table 2 Pre-cursor Fault Type resulting in Unsafe Acts
Violation
n (%)
Perceptual
Error
n (%)
Skill-
Based
Error
n (%)
Decision
Error
n (%)
Total
Automation 6 (54.5) 2 (100.0) 4 (44.4) 7 (38.9) 19 (47.5)
Mechanical 4 (36.4) 0 (0.0) 2 (22.2) 8 (44.4) 14 (35.0)
Auto/Mech 1 (9.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.5)
CRM 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (33.3) 3 (16.7) 6 (15.0)
Total 11 (100.0) 2 (100.0) 9 (100.0) 18 (100.0) 40 (100)
Active Failures in the Descent Phase of Flight
The modern flight deck, with its vast array of systems, is testament to the
success not only of human-centred design philosophies but to the ingenuity of
the hardware and software engineers who design and develop these systems.
Increasingly however, as automation assumed greater levels of responsibility, the
re-allocation of tasks from man to machine has seen crews further removed from
critical flying functions. This, and an accumulation of other factors have, over
time, obscured the position of crews and their role in this complex socio-technical
environment. Underlying an aircraft’s automation are systems dependencies and
interdependencies that often the pilot do not understand and, some would argue,
do not need to understand. This decoupling of pilots - due to high levels of
automation - removes them not only from the process (IAEA, 1992) but can
potentially lead to degraded awareness of the system’s state. Where a problem
manifests, and the provenance of a fault is not clear however, the crew’s
awareness of the underlying cause may inhibit their ability to predict its path and
take corrective action. In such cases, unexpected shifts in attentional demand
associated with the aircraft’s automation can lead to increased cognitive
demands, information overload and task saturation as the crew try to re-orient to
the changing state of the system (Sarter and Woods, 1995). The potential for
these latent pre-conditions (Level 2, 3 and 4 - latent failures) to influence
decisions, skills, and perception and, in extreme cases, the commission of
violations (Level 1 - active failures) becomes ever more likely.
Figure 1 Latent factors that may act as pre-cursors to active failures (Unsafe Acts)
Analysis of the ASRS data showed that, of the 46 events involving mechanical
pre-cursors, significantly more events occurred on Boeing than on Airbus aircraft.
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Source: hfacs.inc, 2014
In contrast, of the 106 automation related pre-cursor events, a greater number
occurred on Airbus aircraft than on Boeing, Table 1. Notwithstanding this, and
despite the divergence associated with their respective design philosophies,
particularly the 'soft limit' (Boeing) and 'hard limit' (Airbus) elements, the evidence
does not indicate that the philosophies or automation acted as pre-cursor or had
an adverse impact on crews. Perhaps the culmination of the decreasing trend in
errors occurring on advanced technology aircraft identified by Funk and Wilson
(1998), and somewhat exonerating and confirming the utility of the human-
centred design approach used by both manufacturer, unsafe acts did not prove
significant in the events analysed (Table 2). Nonetheless, the complexity of
aircraft systems and their integration may give rise to opacity issues that can
inhibit the crew’s awareness of and ability to intervene to resolve a problem
(Durso et al., 2011). The accidents involving Asiana Flight 214 and Air France
Flight AF447, in fact, demonstrate that impoverished awareness of the underlying
systems functionality and the relinquishing of authority by the automation back to
the pilots, are not problems of the past but are still present on the modern airliner.
Crews, unable to track what the automation is doing, may be surprised where the
automation behaves in a way that they do not understand or expect (Sarter and
Woods, 1995). While the limitations of human capacity are difficult to predict -
particularly in a dynamic situation - the adaptability and flexibility of the crew to
detect and trap an error is, nonetheless, their strength (Orasanu, Martin and
Davison, 1997).
Aircraft Manufacturer and Design Philosophy
The different philosophies adopted by two manufacturers is an ongoing source of
debate. Though somewhat of a paradox in a highly standardised sector, these
divergent philosophies, it is proposed, were driven by the need to differentiate
one manufacturer’s aircraft from the others, thus avoiding price wars in this highly
capital-intensive industry (Beckman, 2003; Ibsen, 2009). Interestingly, and
perhaps grounded in their own understanding of the aircraft, pilots tend to favour
the aircraft that they themselves fly. One study found that pilots commented on
the Boeing and Airbus philosophies in a manner that reflected their experience
on, and their preference of, a particular aircraft. Pilots in that study commented
that Boeing “…keeps the pilot in the picture…”, while in contrast, Airbus “…tries
to remove” the pilot from the equation. Furthermore, despite comments that
generally endorsed the “when in doubt use the automation” philosophy, some
pilots consider that “Airbus should have a… switch to give the pilot full authority
of flight controls if needed” (Mitchell, 2009, pp. 25-26). Another study involving
Airbus, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas pilots did not find a difference in
responses to the design philosophy question, but instead found that Airbus pilots
were the only ones who favoured the protection provided by the ‘hard’ limits
performance envelope protection (Tenney, Rogers and Pew, 1995). Divergent
opinions are noticeable even on the issues of usability, control authority and the
level of level of autonomy. Some reporters commented that features of Boeing’s
automation are easier to use, while others considered that the Airbus ‘pilot flying
/ pilot monitoring’ approach was the way forward.
What is clear from the ASRS reports examined for this study however, is
that many crews stated that they were unsure as to why an event occurred and,
more often than not, remained unaware of what led to the issue arising in the first
place. In a number of reports analysed, the pilots have asked “why did this
happen?”, or stated that “I am at a loss to explain what happened”. One First
Officer (FO) in fact had, on a number of different occasions, encountered a pitch-
up initiated by the autopilot resulting in a decrease in speed. When he discussed
the issue with the (different) Captains involved on each occasion, the FO said
that the overwhelming response was “well, it’s a -300” (a reference to a
peculiarities of the Boeing 737-300 Series aircraft). It is vital for crews to have an
understanding of systems integration and dependencies, as well as the control
logic used, in order to ensure that they are not surprised by the automation (Boy,
1998). Furthermore, while it has been proposed that pilots should be the ultimate
arbiter when it comes to control authority, a deeper understanding of the
underlying technology would go some way to enable an understanding of those
over-arching manufacturer’s philosophies (Mitchell, 2009).
Recent events have shown that pilots can become confused by subtle
mode switches, or where the automation disconnects a system unexpectedly.
Undoubtedly, pilots should be armed with the skills, knowledge and experience
to enable them to take control when facing adversity. Training for adversity
enables crews to attain and retain competence, build the mental models and the
heuristics that make decision making easier. Detecting deviations is more likely
where the system deviates from expected behaviour rather than when, without
explicit input or command from the pilot, the system initiates an unexpected action
(Sarter and Woods, 1995).
Conclusion
There is little doubt that automation has made flying safer, more efficient,
and led to increases in performance that would have seemed unimaginable just
a few decades ago. Paradoxically, however, the changing skillsets required to
operate on the modern flight deck, coupled with the reliability of automated
systems, has had an adverse effect on crew performance. Poorly considered
flight deck and systems designs has caused issues in the past, and the
haphazard integration of these systems has led some to question the motivation
for the use of automation. As far back as the late 1970s, it was suggested that
the evolution and proliferation of automation in the cockpit was driven not by
consideration of the role of flight crew, but by engineering feasibility analyses and
costings (Edwards, 1977). Though it took some time for human-centred design
philosophies to gain traction, increasingly we are seeing the benefits of
automation acting as an aid to pilot skills.
There is a stark contrast between Airbus’ hard limit philosophy and
Boeing’s soft limit philosophy. Though significantly more automation related
events occurred on Airbus than Boeing, it was interesting that significantly more
mechanical related events occurred on Boeing than on Airbus aircraft. While it
was not otherwise possible to ascertain how the two diverse design philosophies
affected an event, there was no evidence to suggest that either manufacturer’s
automation was a significant factor in the occurrence of these events.
Nonetheless, while flight crews are still required to manage and operate the
aircraft’s systems, more and more, they are further removed from direct control
of the aircraft. Aircraft manufacturers and systems designers must ensure that
the integrity of aircraft systems is robust and that customers – airlines and crews
– are aware of the fundamental philosophies before deploying into the live
environment. Equally, it is incumbent on airlines to ensure that their crews are
trained, and retain the necessary skills and knowledge to operate the aircraft
safely.
Despite the scale and forms of divergences between these two
manufacturers, there appears to be a lack of research on these diametrically
opposing philosophies. Any comparisons made here, therefore, must be
tempered by this fact. It is suggested that this study be built upon in an effort to
establish data on the effects of automation and awareness of design philosophy
on pilot behaviour, and the occurrence of active failures in flight operations.
Further research in this area may provide an insight into these issues.
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